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Jurisdictional Statement 
This court has jurisdiction over a petition for extraordinary relief under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(2) and over this civil action under § 78-2-2(3)0). 
Issues for Review 
1. Does the failure to file a small claims notice of appeal within thirty days 
deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction? 
2. May the thirty day time limit be extended and, if so, how is the time 
appropriately extended? 
3. If the appellate time limit is not jurisdictional, did the district court 
otherwise abuse its discretion in dismissing the appeal? 
4. Does the doctrine of equitable estoppel mandate that the small claims 
appeal be reinstated? 
Standard of Review 
Under Rule 65B(d)(4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "the court's review shall 
not extend further than to determine whether the respondent has regularly pursued its 
authority." The lower court's legal conclusions are not accorded any deference. Salt 
Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick. 890 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1995). 
The trial court's other actions are at least reviewed for abuse of discretion, and probably 
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for whether there was a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion. Burke v. Lewis, 2005 UT 
44, f 12, 530 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. The first two issues involve legal conclusions while the 
others involve discretion. 
Statement of the Case 
The Respondent is satisfied with the Petitioners' statement of the facts and 
procedural history of this case. 
Summary of Argument 
This case presents a review of the district court judge's decision dismissing a 
notice of appeal that was filed more than 30 days after the small claims judgment was 
entered. The exact reasons for the dismissal are not known from the record. However, it 
appears to be jurisdictionally based. If the dismissal was based on the trial court's 
determination that the 30 day time limit is jurisdictional, that conclusion is not entitled to 
deference. If the dismissal was based on a determination that the Petitioners failed to take 
a necessary step to prosecute their appeal, then the determination is entitled to deference 
and should only be reversed if there was an egregious abuse of discretion. 
This court should determine that the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a small 
claims case is jurisdictional. The appellate courts in this state have consistently stated 
that, in other types of appeals, the timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. An 
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appellate court does not have jurisdiction over an appeal until the notice is filed. 
Therefore, jurisdictional significance is attached to this particular pleading. A time line 
that is fluid would lead to unpredictability and a lack of finality in small claims 
judgments. 
In other circumstances, the time within which an appeal must be filed can be 
extended by following certain procedures set forth under rule. However, the small claims 
rules do not provide a mechanism for extending the time for appeal. Therefore, the small 
claims court could not order an extension. 
If the timely filing of a notice of appeal is not jurisdictional, or if the time may 
otherwise be extended, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the 
appeal. The circumstances under which the language on the small claims affidavit was 
changed from "10" to "30ff do not support a conclusion that the small claims court 
intentionally extended the time within which an appeal could be filed. The Petitioners 
were represented by counsel at all stages of these proceedings and counsel should have 
been aware of the statute and rule. Given the specific language of the statute and rule, it 
was unreasonable for the Petitioners to rely on the handwritten notation to the exclusion 
of more specific authorities. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion. 
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Finally, equitable estoppel does not require that the appeal be reinstated. The 
doctrine should not be extended to preclude an appellate judge from ruling differently 
than a trial court judge. The Petitioners were represented by counsel. It was not 
reasonable for the Petitioners to rely on the handwritten notation on the small claims 
form. The time for filing an appeal would have been readily apparent from reviewing the 
small claims rules. 
Argument 
1. This court's review is limited on a Petition for Extraordinary Relief. 
As noted under the standard of review, a petition for extraordinary relief presents a 
unique set of circumstances for review. Litigants typically may not appeal small claims 
cases to the Supreme Court. However, there may be circumstances in which this court 
should accept a petition for extraordinary relief on a small claims case, if a litigant has not 
had an adequate opportunity to address an action taken by a lower court. This case might 
present such a situation. However, in order to avoid repeated circumvention of the small 
claims appellate limitations, extraordinary relief review should be very limited. 
If the issue presented to this court is a legal conclusion, Salt Lake Child & Family 
Therapy Clinic. Inc. v. Frederick. 890 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1995) mandates that this 
court grant no deference to the district court's legal conclusions. If the issue does not 
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involve a legal conclusion, then the district court's action is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Respondent asserts that the appropriate abuse of discretion standard should be 
that adopted by State v. Stirba. 972 P.2d 918, 922 (Utah App. 1998), which stated that a 
lower court's action would not be disturbed unless the court committed "gross and 
flagrant" abuse of discretion. The gross and flagrant standard is most appropriate when 
reviewing issues such as that which might be presented by this case. 
As will be discussed below, the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a small claims 
case should be declared jurisdictional. If the court determines that timely filing is not 
jurisdictional, then dismissal is left to the discretion of the district court under Rule 12 of 
the Utah Rules of Small Claims Procedure. The gross and flagrant standard would aid in 
preventing repeated circumvention of the appellate restrictions in small claims cases. 
This court therefore will initially determine whether the small claims statute attaches 
jurisdictional significance to the timely filing of a notice of appeal and, absent that, 
should only overturn the dismissal if there was a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion. 
2. The failure to file a notice of appeal within thirty days is jurisdictional. 
Rule 12(a) of the Utah Rules of Small Claims Procedures states that "[a]ny party 
may appeal a final order or judgment within 30 calendar days after judgment or order or 
after denial of a motion to set aside the judgment or order, whichever is later." 
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Subparagraph (b) states: "[t]o appeal, the appealing party must file a notice of appeal in 
the court issuing the judgment. Unless waived upon filing an affidavit of impecuniosity, 
the appropriate fee must accompany the notice of appeal." One of the initial issues in a 
case such as this is whether the language in the rule attaches jurisdictional significance to 
the filing requirements. 
In Panos v. Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County. 2004 UT 87, t 13, 103 
P.3d 695, this court cited paragraph (b) and stated that "the plain language of Rule 12 
fail[s] to attach jurisdictional significance to either filing the notice of appeal or paying 
the required filing fees." The issue in Panos was whether the failure to pay a $10.00 fee 
mandated under Utah Code Ann. § 78-6-14(4) was jurisdictional. The court held that it 
was not. The jurisdictional significance of the notice of appeal itself was not before the 
court. The court's language on this aspect might therefore be dicta. The court's 
statement raises the question of precisely what language would attach jurisdictional 
significance to the timely filing of the notice of appeal. 
In Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 676 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 
1984), this court stated that "it is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that the failure to timely 
perfect an appeal is a jurisdictional failure requiring dismissal of the appeal." The court 
referenced three cases in making this conclusion: Tracy v. University of Utah Hospital 
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619 P.2d 340 (Utah 1980), Watson v. Anderson. 504 P.2d 1003, (Utah 1973), and 
Anderson v. Anderson, 282 P.2d 845 ( Utah 1955). Prowswood involved an 
interpretation of Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the provisions of which 
were subsequently moved into Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. These 
cases and rules help answer the jurisdictional question. 
In Anderson v. Anderson, the court reviewed the separate provisions of Rule 73. 
The rule at the time stated: 
[w]hen an appeal is permitted from a district court to the 
Supreme Court, the time within which an appeal may be taken 
shall be one month from the entry of the judgment appealed 
from unless a shorter time is provided by law, except that 
upon a showing of excusable neglect based on a failure of a 
party to learn of the entry of judgment the district court in any 
action may extend the time for appeal not exceeding one 
month from the expiration of the original time herein 
prescribed. 
Anderson, 282 P.2d at 847. The rule also stated: 
[f]ailure of the appellant to take any of the further steps to 
secure the review of the judgment appealed from does not 
affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such 
remedies as are specified in this rule or, when no remedy is 
specified, for such action as the supreme court deems 
appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal. 
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Id. The Anderson court stated that "the purpose of this rule to make jurisdictional a 
failure to file the notice of appeal on time is clearly evident by the special provision 
therein" concerning the effects of the "further steps." Id. The question that has perhaps 
not been directly answered by these cases is whether jurisdictional significance is 
attached through the language that describes the time within which an appeal must be 
filed or the subsequent "special provision" that discusses the "failure . . . to take any of 
the further steps to secure review."1 Respondent asserts that the jurisdictional 
significance for the notice of appeal should be gleaned through the first sentence or 
clause. The second, "special provision," may clarify or bolster the significance 
established by the first clause, but does not independently establish jurisdictional 
significance for the notice of appeal itself. As has been repeatedly stated by the appellate 
courts, it is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that the timely filing of a notice of appeal is 
jurisdictional. 
There are solid reasons for finding jurisdictional significance with the timely filing 
of the appeal document itself. The filing of certain pleadings establishes jurisdiction in a 
court. Without the filing of those documents, a court does not have jurisdiction. A 
'These cases usually address whether a notice was, in fact, timely or whether a fee 
was also required to establish jurisdiction. 
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district court does not have jurisdiction over a civil matter until a complaint is filed. A 
criminal information establishes jurisdiction over a criminal matter. An appellate court 
does not have jurisdiction until a notice of appeal is filed. There is thus already 
jurisdictional significance attached to the filing of a notice of appeal. It can be argued 
about whether additional requirements are also necessary to establish jurisdiction, but it 
can never be seriously argued that jurisdiction can be established without the filing of 
certain pleadings. It is therefore the first phrase or clause governing the filing of the 
document, which attaches jurisdictional significance. The jurisdictional significance of 
"further steps" may be clarified or limited by subsequent qualifications, but it is the first 
sentence that is important when dealing with the significance of the notice of appeal. 
The time within which a notice of appeal must be filed should not be fluid. The 
law favors finality of judgments. See Holbrook v. Hodson. 466 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 
1970) ("The overriding principle of all the aforementioned rules [on timely motions and 
appeals] is to assure the finality of judgments"). Because jurisdiction is not established 
until the notice is filed, the time should not be subject to the vagueness that can occur 
from a discretionary time line. If notices of appeal are permitted beyond thirty days, then 
late filings may increase and will not be automatically rejected. Motions to dismiss might 
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also increase and judges would then be called upon to decide whether an appeal should be 
accepted. Time and circumstance would become relevant arguments. It might be an 
abuse of discretion to refuse to accept an appeal that is one day late in some 
circumstances, but not an abuse to dismiss an appeal that is fifteen days late under other 
circumstances. Or, it might be an abuse of discretion to dismiss an appeal that is fifteen 
days late if certain circumstances are present, but not an abuse of discretion to dismiss an 
appeal that is one day late if different circumstances are present. Litigants will be faced 
with unpredictability and appellate courts might be faced with an endless stream of cases 
to determine jurisdiction. 
An adverse ruling in this case could certainly result in a rule change declaring a 
failure to file within thirty days to be jurisdictional. However, this would be a unique rule 
change as there aren't any apparent rules which specifically declare that timely filing is 
jurisdictional. This simply leads back to the argument that the rule is sufficiently clear to 
establish jurisdictional significance. A notice of appeal must be filed to confer 
jurisdiction upon the appellate court and the notice must be filed within thirty days. 
Beyond that time, a court does not have jurisdiction. 
In Harlev Davidson v. Workforce Appeals Board of the Utah Dep't of Workforce 
Services, 2005 UT 38, ^  9, 116 P.3d 349, this court was again faced with the issue of 
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whether filing fees created a jurisdictional bar. This court again stated that "[i]n order to 
bring a measure of finality to the orders entered in trial courts and administrative 
agencies, we have authorized appellate courts to assert jurisdiction over appeals only 
when the notice of appeal is timely filed." Id The court noted that the Utah Court of 
Appeals had previously treated appeals under Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure (administrative actions) differently from appeals under Rule 3. Id. at f^ 14. 
Rule 14 did not and does not contain the qualifying language concerning "defects other 
than untimeliness." Id. at ^ 11. The court of appeals had thus apparently found 
jurisdictional significance in the timeliness of an appeal, even absent the "special 
provision" on other defects found in Rule 3. See Hausknect v. Industrial Comm'n., 882 
P.2d 683, 685 (Utah App. 1994). Implicit in the court of appeals determination is that 
jurisdictional significance attaches from a requirement that an appeal be filed within a 
certain period, even if specific language on jurisdictional significance is not found in the 
rule. This court noted that after Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, 17 P.3d 1110, the 
court of appeals had revised its position. The court quoted the court of appeals in stating 
that "there is no reason to treat agency petitions differently than other appeals. Therefore, 
this court, consistent with Gorostieta, determines that timely payment of filing fees is not 
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jurisdictional." Harley Davidson, at f 12. The court thus found consistency even when 
the rules had different provisions. 
These cases help support the proposition that there is, and always has been, 
jurisdictional significance attached to the filing of a notice of appeal. Jurisdiction is tied 
to filing and jurisdiction is tied to timely filing. There are questions about whether other 
defects raise jurisdictional problems, but all appeals should otherwise be treated 
consistently and the timely filing of a notice of appeal should be jurisdictional. 
3. The small claims judge did not order an extension of time. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that unless "appropriately extended," the 
time limit for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. Serrato v. Utah Transit Authority, 
2000 UT App 299, t 7, 13 P.3d 616. In the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure there are 
specific provisions for appropriately extending the time within which an appeal must be 
filed. Rule 4(e) explains the process. There is no similar provision in the Utah Rules of 
Small Claims Procedure. Therefore, a litigant must file an appeal within thirty days. 
The Petitioners argue that the small claims court extended the time within which 
their appeal could be filed. The Petitioners cite Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure as authority for the extension. However, Rule 81(c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure states that the rules of civil procedure "shall not apply to small proceedings 
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(sic) except as expressly incorporated in the Small Claims Rules." There is thus no 
provision for extending the time for appeal in small claims cases. 
Even assuming that the time could be extended, a court would be required to 
follow "appropriate" procedures before extending the time. In this case, there is no 
indication that the Petitioners requested an extension or that the court ordered an 
extension of time. The only thing that occurred in this case is that the court was notified 
by the Petitioners' attorney that the Legislature had changed the time for appeal. The 
court then changed "10" to "30" on the small claims form. There is nothing to indicate 
that the small claims court considered, or was asked to consider, extending the time from 
thirty calendar days to thirty business days. Therefore, the time was not "appropriately 
extended." 
4. If the timely filing of a notice is not jurisdictional, the court did mot otherwise 
abuse its discretion in dismissing the appeal. 
Rule 12 states that "the district court may dismiss the appeal and remand the case 
to the justice court if the appellant: . . . fails to take any step necessary to prosecute the 
appeal."2 A trial court has discretion to dismiss an appeal if the appellant does not take 
the appropriate steps to prosecute the appeal. If the court determines that timely filing is 
2This case did not originate in a justice court. Presumably, the rule would still 
apply to cases originating in the small claims division of a district court. 
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not jurisdictional, filing within 30 days should still be considered a necessary step to 
prosecute an appeal. The failure to file within 30 days will therefore support dismissal. 
A trial court should have broad discretion in these matters and, as discussed above, an 
appellate court should only overturn a decision if there was an egregious abuse of 
discretion. There is no evidence that the court abused its discretion, or that the court 
abused its discretion in an egregious manner. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-6-10(1) states that a party may appeal a small claims 
judgment "by filing a notice of appeal in the original trial court within thirty days of entry 
of the judgment." There is nothing in the statute stating whether the time is counted by 
business days or calendar days. However, there is nothing in statute to even suggest that 
an individual would consider the time to be business days. Rule 12 is even more specific. 
The rule specifically states that a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty calendar 
days. The only piece of information that was contrary to these authorities was a 
handwritten notation on a form. 
According to the facts provided by the Petitioners, the circumstances under which 
the notation appeared on the form could not have lead to a clear-cut determination by the 
Petitioners that the Petitioners were requesting an extension of time. There is also 
nothing to indicate that the small claims court intended to supercede the statute and rule 
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and provide a different time frame. At the very least, the actions would have created an 
obligation on the part of the Petitioners to review the relevant statute and rule and 
determine when a appeal should be filed. The Petitioners were represented by counsel at 
all stages of the proceedings and counsel should have been aware of the statute and rule. 
If there was any confusion over the time frame it would have been incumbent on the 
Petitioners to rely on the shorter time frame, rather than risk reliance on a longer time 
frame. 
Under these circumstances, the district court would not have abused its discretion 
in dismissing the appeal under Rule 12. The rule contained clear authority on when the 
appeal should have been filed. The district court could have determined that the 
Petitioners unreasonably relied on the edited handwritten form and therefore the court did 
not abuse its discretion. 
5. Equitable estoppel does not provide relief. 
The Petitioners state that equitable estoppel requires the court to hold a trial de 
novo. The Petitioners rely on Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n., 602 
P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979) in support of their argument. Celebrity Club required that 
three elements be met in order for equitable estoppel to apply. In footnote 10 to Celebrity 
Club, Inc., the court stated that "estoppel arises when a party by his acts, representations, 
16 
or admissions, or by his silence when he ought to speak, intentionally or through culpable 
negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and that such other, with 
reasonable prudence and diligence, relies and acts thereon so that he will suffer an 
injustice if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts." 
The Petitioners dismiss this footnote as not being part of the elements of equitable 
estoppel. However, the footnote cited another case, Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 
P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976) in which this language was cited to explain equitable estoppel. 
The footnote explains what is necessary under the three elements. The elements of 
equitable estoppel are: (1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim 
afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party on the faith of such admission, 
statement, or act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first party 
to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement, or act. Id at 694. 
There are several reasons why equitable estoppel should not apply. First, by its 
terms, the elements include a party making a statement or acting in a particular way, and 
the party subsequently contradicts or repudiates the action or statement. The Petitioners 
have not provided any authority that applies this principle to actions by a trial court judge 
that are arguably repudiated or contradicted by an appellate court judge. In Celebrity 
Club, the court recognized that this principle applies against government officials and 
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boards. However, the principle should not apply to bind an appellate judge (the district 
court judge in this case) to the actions of a lower court judge. Litigants know that a trial 
judge's actions can be reversed on appeal. The actions of the appellate judge should not 
be considered a repudiation or contradiction of the trial judge for purposes of estoppel. 
There are also various "statements" that might be at issue in this case. There are 
three areas in which the time frame for filing a notice of appeal has been stated: the 
statute, the rule, and the small claims form. The Petitioners simply have not drawn an 
appropriate connection between certain statements and subsequent actions. 
Also, as the footnote in Celebrity Club, Inc. clarifies, a party who relies on 
statements must act reasonably and with diligence in order to solidify such reliance. As 
has been noted, the facts leading to the changing of the small claims form do not support 
a determination of reasonable reliance. At best, these actions created confusion as to 
what was the appropriate time frame for filing a notice of appeal. With brief, reasonable 
inquiry, the Petitioners would have found the provision in Rule 12, which clearly states 
that the appeal must be filed within 30 calendar days. If this were a case in which the 
Petitioners were not represented by counsel, perhaps their argument would be stronger as 
to the purposes of the small claims forum in ensuring that unwitting litigants are not 
unfairly punished. However, this is a case in which represented parties unreasonably 
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risked filing a notice of appeal 42 days after a small claims judgment was entered. 
Equitable estoppel is not available to the Petitioners in this case. 
Conclusion 
Consistent with rulings in other cases, this court should determine that the timely 
filing of a notice of appeal in a small claims action is jurisdictional. There are significant 
legal and policy reasons supporting such a determination. If the time is not jurisdictional, 
then the court did not otherwise abuse its discretion, because the Petitioners unreasonably 
relied upon a handwritten notation to the exclusion of other, more specific directives. 
DATED this rj day of September, 2005. 
Brent M. Johnson, Attorney for 
Honorable Glenn K. iWasaki 
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